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PROBLEMS WITH AUSTRIAN 
BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY 
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL 
University ofSeuth-Gcirolina-· · ie ,,c,s., 
A s A HISTORIAN, I have long been interested in applying the insights of Austrian theory to the interpretation of business cycles as they have 
occurred in history. In pursuing this endeavor, I have encountered what I 
believe are a number of problems with Austrian business cycle theory. 
Although brought into relief by historical inquiry, the problems themselves 
are not historical. On the contrary, they are all theoretical in nature. Some 
are merely areas where the implications of Austrian theory have yet to be 
fully worked out. Others are more serious in that, if they are not resolved, 
they imply that Austrian business cycle theory is erroneous. Some I feel 
close to having resolved myself; on others, I can only offer constructive 
comments. 
I will present six of these problems in this paper, but first I should expose 
one of my fundamental assumptions. This assumption informs my presenta­
tion of several of these problems and, in my experience, has proved very 
controversial. Frequently, those attempting to resolve these questions will 
do so by challenging this assumption. 
According to Austrian theory, the boom or cyclical upswing consists of a 
lengthening of the structure of production induced by credit expansion. The 
depression or cyclical downturn consists of a shortening of the structure of 
production until it is back into coordination with consumers' time prefer­
ences. The importance for Austrian theory of these changes in the structure 
of production cannot be overrated. Unlike many other economic theories of 
the business cycle, Austrian theory does not fix or hold constant the capital 
stock but makes it the crucial variable. This fact further permits the integra­
tion of Austrian growth theory with Austrian business cycle theory. 
My fundamental assumption consists of the observation that, because the 
boom is a lengthening of the structure of production while a depression is a 
shortening of it, violent fluctuations in time preferences that generate similar 
alternations between lengthening and shortening can theoretically cause a 
business cycle. Stated another way, this assumption means that the 
lengthening of the structure of production that occurs as the result of credit 
expansion and the lengthening of the structure of production that occurs as 
the result of a genuine shift in time preferences are basically identical except 
for the fact that the lengthening due to credit expansion must in the future be 
reversed because it is inconsistent with underlying consumers' tastes. 
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Much Austrian writing on the business cycle is not only compatible with 
this fundamental assumption but directly implies it. If the changes in the 
structure of production induced by credit expansion are different from 
changes in the structure of production caused by changes in time preferences 
in some essential respect other than that they must in the future be reversed, 
no one has explicitly identified this additional difference. The only argument 
against this assumption that I have encountered alleges that the two 
lengthenings of the structure of production are different in character because 
one involves a coordination of the plans of consumers and entrepreneurs 
while the other involves a discoordination of plans. 1 Therefore, one is in 
some sense more real than the other, which is merely illusory. This argu­
ment, however, does nothing more than restate in different words the basic 
difference already admitted: the lengthened structure of production induced 
by credit expansion must be reversed when consumers' actual time prefer­
ences finally reassert themselves. It does not prove the existence or indicate 
the nature of any additional differences. 
Perhaps I can illustrate this point more clearly with an analogy. Assume 
that consumers' money that would be spent on good A is expropriated by the 
government through taxes to be spent on good B. Entrepreneurs divert 
resources in response to the new market signals. Now, one can say that the 
economy is discoordinated with the desires of consumers, that resources 
spent on the production of B are wasted, and that if the government stops its 
expropriation, the market will shift back again. One cannot, however, 
contend that the demand for B manifested by the government with its 
ill-gotten gains is illusory or that the effect it has on the economy is any 
different from the effect if the consumers themselves had shifted in a similar 
degree from A to B. Money creation is just another means of expropriation, 
and if it did not actually succeed in diverting resources, there would be no 
reason to employ it. Credit expansion does divert real resources-that is the 
meaning of "forced savings"; and to the extent that it does so, the 
lengthened structure of production induced by credit expansion is just as real 
as the lengthened structure of production caused by changes in time prefer­
ences. 
Problem 1: Asymmetry. During the boom when the structure of produc­
tion is lengthened, the capital goods industries (or goods of the higher 
orders) expand while the consumers' goods industries (or goods of the lower 
orders) contract. Labor is bid from consumers' goods industries to capital 
goods industries. During the depression, when the structure of production is 
shortened, the reverse takes place. The consumers' goods industries expand, 
the capital goods industries contract, and labor is bid from the latter to the 
former. Why are these two processes not symmetrical in their effect? Why is 
the expansion of the capital goods industries and the contraction of the 
consumers' goods -industries accompanied by general prosperity and full 
employment, while the expansion of the consumers' goods industries and 
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the contraction of the capital goods industries accompanied by general 
depression and unemployment? Why is not frictional unemployment equally 
great in both directions? Why, to use the analogy above, is the process not 
similar to taxing expenditures on good A to make expenditures on good B? 
When the tax is imposed, industry B expands and industry A contracts. 
When the tax is repealed, a reverse, but symmetrical, reaction takes place! 
Actually, one must distinguish two aspects of this asymmetry between 
booms and depressions. First, there is asymmetry in employment. Second, 
even without employment effects, there is asymmetry in the way individuals 
generally perceive their economic fortunes. As Austrians frequently and 
quite correctly emphasize, depressions are not centered in single industries 
or groups of industries but are general phenomena in which losses and 
failures are widespread. Conversely, booms are periods of general prosper­
ity. 
The asymmetry in employment i.s easier to discuss. F. A. Hayek, in Prices 
and Production, offers one explanation that I find unsatisfactory. 3 He 
essentially argues that when the expansion in the consumers' goods indus­
tries bids some labor away from the capital goods industries, the remaining 
laborers in the capital goods industries are thrown out of work because there 
are not enough of them to complete the projects in the higher orders but too 
many of them to be absorbed in the lower orders where the projects are too 
short. Clearly, this• argument makes some peculiar assumptions about the 
demand curves for labor in both the higher and lower orders. Is there no wage 
rate low enough at which all labor could be reabsorbed by the lower orders? 
As a substitute for Hayek's tortuous explanation, one could more simply 
explain the employment asymmetry by reference to real wages. During the 
boom, as credit expansion drives the interest rate down, real wages (mea­
sured by comparing nominal wages with the price of labor's product) are by 
implication going up. Duri~g the depression, as the reassertion of time 
preferences brings the interest rate back up, real wages fall. The shift of labor 
during the boom is accompanied by rising real wages; the shift of labor 
during the depression, by falling real wages. This could explain the asym­
metry in employment. Including the real wage as a factor, however, forces 
Austrian economists to relinquish the claim that they, unlike other schools of 
thought, explain unemployment solely be reference to the maldistribution of 
labor. 
Hayek also deals with the asymmetry in prosperity, again in Prices and 
Production, in a footnote: 
The reason for this assymetry [sic] between a transition to longer 
processes of production, which need not bring about any of these 
peculiar disturbances, and a transition to shorter processes, which will 
regularly be accompanied by a crisis, will perhaps become more evi­
dent if it is considered that in the former case there will necessarily be 
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time to amortize the capital invested in the existing structure before the 
new process is completed, while in the latter case this will evidently be 
impossible and therefore a loss of capital and a reduction in income 
inevitable. 4 
To the extent that I understand what Hayek is driving at, he is saying that a 
shortening of the structure of production, by its nature, requires capital 
losses, while lengthening does not. 
If my interpretation of Hayek is correct, he is stating in another manner the 
same explanation for the asymmetry in prosperity that is implied in the works 
of Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard. Both Mises and Rothbard 
assert, when discussing growth, that an economy in which the structure of 
production is being lengthened experiences net pure (entrepreneurial) pro­
fits, while an economy in which the structure of production is being shor­
tened experiences net pure losses. According to Mises, the net pure profits in 
a progressing economy result from the additional wealth and increased real 
income produced by the lengthened structure of production. 5 While intui­
tively appealing, Mises's reasoning is hardly conclusive, especially in view 
of the time lag between the initiation of a new lengthening process and the 
increased output of consumers' goods. Rothbard's explanation is a bit more 
rigorous: 
For profits to appear, there must be undercapitalization, or overdis­
counting, of productive factors on the market. For losses to appear, 
there must be overcapitalization, or underdiscounting, of factors on the 
market. But if the economy is stationary, i.e., if from one period to 
another the total gross investment remains constant, the total value of 
capital remains constant. ... Aggregate capital values remain constant, 
and therefore any profits ... must be offset by equal losses .... In the 
progressing economy, on the other hand, there are additional invest· 
ment funds made available through new savings, and this provides a 
source of new revenue not yet capitalized anywhere in the system. 
These constitute the aggregate net profits during this period of change. 
In the retrogressing economy, investment funds are lowered, and this 
leaves net areas of overcapitalization of factors in the economy. Their 
owners suffer aggregate let losses during this period of change. 6 
One would suppose that if the assumption of net pure profits during a 
lengthening and net pure losses during a shortening of the structure of 
production was crucial to Austrian business cycle theory, then it would have 
received greater attention in Austrian writings. If Austrian theory cannot 
explain the asymmetry in prosperity, it cannot explain the business cycle at 
all. The reason, of course, that the issue of net pure profits has not received 
the attention it deserves is that is has never been raised within the context of 
cycles but rather always within the context of growth. Indeed, by injecting 
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the issue into the discussion of cycles, I have opened myself to the criticism 
of confusing cycles with growth. This accusation, however, is simply 
another way of challenging my fundamental assumption about the basic 
similarity of a lengthened structure of production due to credit expansion and 
a lengthened structure of production due to changes in time preferences, and 
the same arguments apply. The asymmetry in prosperity must either be 
inherent in the nature of changes in the structure of production itself, or it is 
inherent in the process used to alter the structure of production. The issue of 
net pure profits implies the former. If this is so, then the same process should 
create booms and depressions regardless of what is happening to the struc­
ture of production, and the entire lengthening-shortening analysis becomes 
superfluous verbiage disguising the real issue. 
Problem 2: Definition oftheMoney Stock. For most Austrian economists, 
an exact definition of the money stock may be a thorny empirical question, 
but it does not pose any serious theoretical issues. I think the problem does 
have theoretical significance, but before I indicate why, I will restate the 
problem in a more precise fashion. In any developed economy, a wide 
spectrum of various types of financial instruments exist, ranging from bank 
notes and deposits to bonds and bills of exchange. What is needed is not a 
definition for money; all Austrians recognize that money is a generally 
accepted medium of exchange. What is needed is a defining criterion for 
what constitutes a money substitute, so that this wide spectrum of financial 
instruments can be clearly divided between those that are money substitutes 
and those that are credit instruments. 
The reason a clear dividing line is necessary relates to the various means 
by which a genuine change in time preferences on the part of consumers can 
manifest itself. An individual with a money income continuously faces three 
possible ways of allocating that income. He can spend it on consumers' 
goods, he can spend it on investment goods, or he can increase (or decrease) 
his cash balances. Time preferences determine the aggregate ratio between 
consumption and investment, which in turn determines the nature of the 
structure of production. A simple change in time preferences occurs when 
spending is reallocated from consumption to investment or vice versa. But 
non-neutral changes in the demand for money can also affect the structure of 
production. A neutral change in the demand for money would be, say, a fall 
in cash balances that increased equally both consumption and investment 
spending, thus maintaining the same aggregate consumption-investment 
ratio. If, however, cash balances fall primarily by adding to investment 
spending, this is, in effect, a fall in time preferences. Similarly, if cash 
balances fall primarily by adding to consumption spending, this represents a 
rise in time preferences. 
The dividing line between money substitutes and credit instruments is the 
margin between cash balances and investment. If this margin is not well 
defined, then it becomes theoretically impossible to distinguish between 
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changes in the stock of money and changes in time preferences brought about 
by non-neutral shifts in the demand for money relative to investment spend­
ing. For example, time deposits are an item that some Austrian economists 
view as money substitutes, while others view them as credit instruments. 
Suppose that, for some reason, people tum in their demand deposits for time 
deposits, so that the aggregate quantity of one falls in favor of a rise in the 
aggregate quantity of the other. Now, if time deposits are money substitutes, 
then this shift merely reflects a change in the form in which people wish to 
hold money. But if time deposits are credit instruments, then, ceteris 
paribus, this shift represents a fall in the demand for money in favor of 
investment spending, that is, a genuine fall in time preferences. 
Let us assume that we have an economy which has a banking system with 
only time deposits and that there is no central bank. Consider the case in 
which the quantity of time deposits increases over a period until a banking 
panic wipes them all out. Such a sequence of events, especially in the 
absence of a central bank, may not be very likely, but it is at least theoreti­
cally conceivable. Clearly, all would agree that this sequence would gener­
ate the characteristic boom and depression of the business cycle. Depending, 
however, on whether one considers time deposits to be money substitutes or 
credit instruments, one could attribute this cycle either to credit expansion or 
to violent fluctuations in time preferences (manifested through non-neutral 
changes in the demand for money). 
Many of the earlier Austrians recognized this close connection between 
changes in the stock of money and changes in the demand for money. Hayek 
evaded the whole issue by talking about the effective money supply (some 
form ofMV) and making a distinction between a constant money supply and 
a neutral money supply, the latter being one in which shifts in the stock of 
money counteract non-neutral shifts in demand. 7 The haziness of the bor­
derline between credit expansion and changes in time preferences also 
reinforces my fundamental assumption about the basic similarity of the 
impact of either on the structure of production. I do believe, however, that it 
is possible to arrive at a theoretical criterion that clearly and unambiguously 
divides money substitutes from credit instruments and thus preserves the 
important distinction between credit expansion and genuine changes in time 
preferences, but that is the subject of another paper on which I am currently 
working, and I do not have the space to present my conclusions here. My 
point here was to explain why I think the problem is important enough to be 
worth resolving. 
Problem 3: Net Investment. Lengthening the structure of production 
entails positive net investment. Maintaining the structure of production 
intact at its current length entails zero net investment. Shortening the 
structure of production entails disinvestment. During depressions, there­
fore, net investmen( should be negative. But in U.S. history, the only 
depression in which measured net investment was actually negative was the 
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Great Depression. In all the others for which data are av~ilable, net invest­
ment fell but still remained positive. Does this mean that Austrian theory is 
irrelevant to all but one major depression in U.S. history?8 
One obvious way around this difficulty is to show how the Austrian 
concept of net investment is different from the net investment measured by 
national income accountants. This, in fact, is the approach taken by Hayek in 
Prices and Production, where he argues that net investment will be mea­
sured, not only when the structure of production is initially lengthened, but 
continuously until the new structure is completed and the expanded output of 
consumers' goods pours forth on the market. He concludes that, once a 
structure is lengthened, there is some declining rate of positive net invest­
ment that will exactly maintain it until the time of completion, when 
measured net investment can fall to zero. Any fall in measured net invest­
ment faster than this rate will necessitate a shortening of the structure. 9 
In a later essay, ''Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and Malin­
vestments," Hayek took a slightly different approach. By the time Hayek 
wrote this essay, he had despaired of giving any meaning to the notion of 
maintaining capital intact. This made it impossible to measure net invest­
ment at all. Hayek therefore decided that all statements about the absolute 
size of the capital stock should be purged from discussions of business 
cycles. What is important is whether the plans of entrepreneurs coincide with 
the plans of consumers. If they do, everything is fine; if they do not, 
regardless of whether "entrepreneurs lengthen the investment period by 
more than is justified by the voluntary 'saving' of consumers" or "they do 
not shorten the existing processes of production sufficiently to take full 
account of the 'impatience' of consumers," a depression will result.' 0 
On the whole, I think Hayek's first approach to the problem is more 
fruitful. As pointed out above, the discoordination of the expectations of 
entrepreneurs with the tastes of consumers is simply another way of stating 
that market forces are going to require the entrepreneurs to revise their plans. 
This revision will be necessary regardless of whether or not entrepreneurial 
plans _were at one time consistent with consumers' preferences. Hayek in 
effect admits this in the very same essay when he points out that both credit 
expansion and violent fluctuations in saving will generate business cycles. 
Furthermore, the direction of the dis coordination is vitally important. Hayek 
would certainly not contend that, if entrepreneurs somehow underestimate 
consumer saving and thus are forced to revise their plans and quickly 
lengthen the structure of production, a boom followed by a depression will 
result. Yet that is what he must contend if it is solely the discoordination that 
is important. In reality, the fact that the discoordination requires sudden 
shortening of the structure of production is what is important. Without the 
shortening, there will be no depression. 
Despite these objections, "Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances 
and Malinvestments" does make an important contribution as the first 
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attempt to apply Austrian business cycle theory within a dynamic setting. All 
other discussions of Austrian business cycle theory superimpose the impact 
of credit expansion on a stationary economy. Presumably, some of the 
conclusions might need modification if, instead, the impact of credit expan­
sion is superimposed upon a progressing economy with falling time prefer­
ences. A depression could be forestalled if the increased real saving that 
otherwise would have further lengthened the structure of production is 
sufficient to maintain the malinvestments induced by credit expansion. 
Problem 4: Deflation. Actually, this problem subsumes a lot more than its 
title implies. It includes all the additional events other than credit expansion 
that will, according to a consistent application of Austrian theory, cause a 
depression. All of them can cause depressions with no previous boom; a few 
seem to necessitate a trailing boom. I have called this the deflation problem 
not only because deflation appears to be the most empirically probable of 
these possibilities but also because of Rothbard's position that deflation is 
not really harmful but is in some cases beneficial. 11 
a. Capital Consumption: I have already noted that violent fluctuations in 
time preferences can cause a boom-depression sequence. In fact, all that is 
strictly necessary is a rise in time preferences. As time preferences rise, the 
structure of production will shorten, and a depression will continue until 
time preferences stabilize. Capital consumption will always involve depres­
sion. 
b. Deflation: Deflation or, more precisely, credit contraction will drive 
the loan rate of interest above the natural rate. If credit contraction occurs as 
a secondary feature of a depression already caused by previous credit 
expansion, it will bring about more shortening of the structure of production 
than is necessary and aggravate the depression. If credit contraction occurs 
with no immediately preceding credit expansion, it will cause a depression 
with no prior boom. In both cases, a trailing boom should follow when 
consumers' time preferences reassert themselves. 
c. Consumption spending stimulated through monetary expansion: 12 If 
new money, rather than entering the loan market, is spent exclusively on 
consumption, then this should artificially shorten the structure of produc­
tion. A depression with a trailing boom will result. This conclusion is 
noteworthy because one might argue that war-time monetary expansions 
actually follow this pattern. Historically, however, war-time monetary ex­
pansions have not been accompanied by depressions, although they also 
have not generally created investment booms. This would suggest that in 
practice war-time monetary expansions have been neutral with respect to the 
structure of production. I should further add that the consequences pre­
dicted, both for deflation and consumption spending stimulated through 
monetary expansion, are based on the assumption of a stationary economy. 
If one assumes an underlying progressing economy, then some of the 
depression effects will be offset by falling time preferences. 
AUSTRIAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY 49 
Problem 5: Constant Rate of Credit Expansion. Austrian economists are 
very fond of claiming that once a credit expansion has induced a boom the 
only alternatives open are a depression or a hyperinflation. The implication 
of this claim is that only an accelerating rate of credit expansion can keep the 
boom fueled. But nowhere is the outcome of a credit expansion at a steady 
rate clearly specified. Presumably, since such a policy cannot generate a 
continuous boom, it must either result in (a) a continuous alternation of 
booms and depressions or (b) a boom followed by a continuous depression. 
Much Austrian writing is ambiguous between these two alternatives. 13 
When I first formulated this problem, I was uncertain about the answer. I 
have now concluded that a constant rate of credit expansion will produce a 
boom, followed by a period in which the economy is adjusted to the credit 
expansion. The reason for this conclusion is that, ceteris paribus, a constant 
rate of increase in credit has the same impact on the structure of production as 
a once-and-for-all fall in time preferences that moves the consumption­
investment ratio to a new stable level. In other words, the structure of 
production is lengthened and then maintained at the new level. This result 
must not be confused with a continuous boom, which involves a continuous 
lengthening of the structure of production. That obviously does require 
accelerating credit expansion. 
Surprisingly, especially in light of the fact that in his popular writings 
Hayek is one of the most prominent purveyors of the hyperinflation­
depression trade-off, my conclusion finds support in some of Hayek's 
writings. For instance, in Prices and Production, Hayek says: 
... in order to attract as great a proportion of the original factors, i.e., in 
order merely to maintain the already existing capital, every new in­
crease would have to expand progressively at a constant rate. But in 
order to bring about constant additions to capital, it would have to do 
14more: it would have to increase at a constantly increasing rate . 
More recently, in' 'Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect,'' Hayek seems 
to admit that a constant rate of increase would maintain the malinvest­
rnents.15 In both locations, however, Hayek goes on to express doubts that 
such measures can maintain the malinvestments indefinitely. 
Obviously, there must exist some rate at which credit expansion will 
maintain the lengthened structure of production. A frequent argument used 
iO support the proposition that this rate must be an accelerating one is that 
;mticipations will adjust to the credit expansion and counteract its effects. To 
be convincing, however, this argument must identify exactly what is being 
anticipated. Anticipations about changes in the price level cannot alleviate a 
distortion of relative prices. The Fisher effect may raise the interest rate, but 
because it operates on both the demand and supply side of the loan market, it 
voill not raise interest enough to overcome the impact of the new credit. If the 
aatural rate is 4 percent and a credit expansion begins which lowers the loan 
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rate to 3 percent and causes a 2 percent increase in the price level, the Fisher 
effect will drive the loan rate up to 5 percent. To offset the credit expansion, 
however, it would have to push the loan rate up to 6 percent; but in order to 
do that, it would have to affect the demand and supply for loanable funds 
disproportionately. The supply must fall relative to the demand, which 
would mean that real savings are decreasing and time preferences rising. 
Perhaps expectations about the rising prices of consumers' goods might 
cause consumers to increase their ·demand for such goods at an accelerating 
rate, bringing into operation the Ricardo effect. The money with which 
consumers do this, however, must come from somewhere. By hypothesis, it 
cannot come from rising nominal incomes because the new money is only 
entering the economy at a constant rate. Therefore, it must come at the 
expense of investment spending or cash balances. In either case, we again 
have a rise in time preferences. Or, a neutral fall in the demand for money 
that increases investment and consumption spending equally would also 
require the rate of credit expansion to accelerate if the lengthened structure of 
production is to be maintained. The consumption-investment ratio of con­
sumers would be the same, but an increase in the nominal amount of 
consumption spending necessitates a similar increase in the nominal amount 
of new money spent on investment. 
In sum, if time preferences and the demand for money remain the same, 
then a constant rate of credit expansion will maintain an artificially 
lengthened structure of production. Only if anticipations change time prefer­
ences or the demand for money, will the rate of credit expansion have to 
accelerate. Let me close by making clear what I am not claiming. I am not 
denying that prolonged credit expansion might have other deleterious and 
discoordinating effects. I am not ruling out the kind of unsystematic distor­
tions advanced by Leijonhufvud. Unsystematic distortions, however, do not 
constitute general phenomena, and as pointed out above, it is general 
phenomena that characterize the business cycle. 
Problem 6: International Aspects. Rather than being a specific problem, 
this is an area where Austrian theory needs to be more fully worked out. 
Austrian economists have for the most part developed their business cycle 
theory within the context of a closed economy and have rarely applied it to an 
international setting. To illustrate, I list three kinds of international envi­
ronments to which Austrian theory might be applied. 
a. An international environment of competing national central banks. 
This is clearly the one international case for which a lot of work with 
Austrian theory has already been done. 
b. An international environment with a central bank in one nation and a 
decentralized fractional-reserve banking system in another. Much can be 
extrapolated to this case from the previous one, although this case has not 
been explicitly considered. The reason this case is worth pursuing is that it 
represents the very relationship that existed between the United States and 
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Great Britian throughout most of the 19th century. How theoretically sound 
are the recent historical efforts suggesting that the U.S. banking system was 
just the tail being wagged by the Bank of England dog? 
c. An international environment with a central bank in one nation and a 
commodity, 100 percent reserve standard in another. There has been no 
work, even by implication, on this case. It is important because it isolates the 
question whether capital flows from the country with a central bank can 
induce malinvestments in a country with a commodity standard. Are 100 
percent reserves a safeguard against credit expansion elsewhere in the 
world? 
The three cases that I have listed are not confined in their significance to an 
international environment. The principles discovered in examining them 
could also be applied to certain types of intranational monetary arrange­
ments. The 1acksonian period in U.S. history, with its rich variety of 
banking schemes in the several states, is an example that immediately comes 
to mind. 
Having completed my exposition of these six problems, I notice that I 
have offered more solutions than when I originally formulated the questions 
and started the paper. So I feel that I should add that I consider many of my 
conclusions tentative. My main purpose is not to argue that my resolutions 
are the final answers but to raise these issues so that others will be stimulated 
to think about them and perhaps arrive at more satisfactory answers. Rumor 
has it that at a recent strategy meeting, the top-flight Austrian economists 
decided that the Austrian business cycle theory should be deemphasized in 
favor of other aspects of Austrian theory. As is obvious from this paper, I 
think the exact opposite should be done. We need more, not less, work on 
Austrian business cycle theory. 
1. Friedrich A. von Hayek implies this argument in his 1933 essay "Price Expectations, 
Monetary Disturbances and Malinvestments." which appears in his book Profits, Interest and 
Investment (1939; reprinted., Clifton, N.J., 1975), pp. 135-56. Hayek himself does admit that 
violent fluctuations in real savings could also cause business cycles: see Monetary Theory and 
the Trade Cycle (1933; reprinted., Clifton, N.J., 1975), pp. 205-6; "Saving," in Profits, 
Interest and Investment, pp. 166, 167; "Price Expectations," p. 143. I will return again in this 
essay to the latter essay. 
Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., and Sudha R. Shenoy, in an article which relies heavily on the 
discoordination theme, appear to make self-reversibility the defining characteristic of discoor­
dination. See "Inflation, Recession, and Stagflation," in The Foundations ofModern Austrian 
Economics, ed. Edwin G. Dolan (Kansas City, Mo., 1976), particularly p. 201. 
2. The asymmetry problem is not original with me. Gottfried Haberler raises it in Prosper­
ity and Depression, 3d ed. (London, 1958), p. 71, and he cites as precursors E. F. M. Durbin, 
The Problem ofCredit Policy (New York, 1935), pp. 242-47, and C. Bresciani-Turroni, "The 
Theory of Saving: II," Economica, n.s. 3 (1936): 175-76. 
52 REASON PAPERS NO. 5 
3. F. A. Hayek, Prices and Production, 2d ed. (1935; reprinted., New York, 1967), pp. 
92-93. 
4. Ibid., p. 93. Later, in the title essay of Profits, Interest and Investment, when Hayek 
introduced the Ricardo effect, he partially got around the asymmetry in prosperity with a 
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